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ON BEING A POSITIVIST:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR VAUGHAN
PETER W. HOGG*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article in this journal,' I mentioned that I did not
believe in natural rights, and I added: "If that makes me a positivist,
so be it.' 2 Although that was my one reference to legal positivism,
Professor Vaughan has published an article asserting that various evil
results are entailed by "Hogg's positivism" and demanding that I
justify my position! In this article, I attempt to reply.
I1. IS LEGAL POSITIVISM MORALLY REPUGNANT?
Let me respond first to the suggestions that legal positivism
"fails those who are oppressed," "favours oppression over freedom,"
and "reduces our outrage over apartheid to silence."4  Professor
Vaughan portrays natural law, as expounded by Blackstone,5 as a
C Copyright, 1991, Peter IV. Hogg.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 P.W. Hogg, "he Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation" (1987)
25 Osgoode Hall L. 87.
2 Ibid at 89.
3 F. Vaughan, "On Being A Positivist: Does It Really Matter?" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall
LJ. 399.
4Ibid at 402 & 403.
5 Sir Wv. Blackstone, Coimnentaries on the Laws of England, vols 1-4, 5th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1765).
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
progressive force, and legal positivism, as expounded by Bentham,
6
as a reinforcement of the unjust status quo. This will come as a
surprise to those who remember Bentham's reforming zeal - he may
have been the most influential law reformer in British history - and
the fact is that Professor Vaughan's portrayal is quite misleading.
The theory of legal positivism holds that law consists
exclusively of "positive" law, meaning law that has been made by the
law-making institutions of the state. Legal positivism denies the
existence of a "natural law" that emanates from some source other
than the law-making institutions of the state. But legal positivism
does not involve a denial of the existence of moral principles,
universal or particular. All that legal positivism insists upon is that
there is a distinction between law and morality. That distinction
cannot be complete, because it is obvious that the laws of a society
are profoundly influenced by and reinforced by moral values. But,
for a legal positivist, there is no certainty that moral values will be
faithfully reflected in positive law. In other words, the legal
positivist accepts that there can be laws that are morally wrong or
unjust. It does not follow, as Professor Vaughan suggests, that legal
positivism "fails those who are oppressed," etc. On the contrary, by
insisting upon a distinction between law and morality, the positivist
is free to employ moral values in order to criticize unjust laws, to
refuse to obey them, and - if need be - to suffer and die for
principles of justice. It is not the case that all those courageous
people who have resisted the forces of tyranny are believers in
natural law.
Blackstone gave this account of natural law in his
Commentaries:
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding all over the globe, in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this;
and such of them as are valid derive all of their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original.
7
6 j. Bentham, A Fragment on Governnent (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
7 My references are to the original edition of Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England, vols 1-4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765) at 41.
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This postulates a body of natural law that is universal and
immutable, not varying from place to place or from time to time.
Its rules are superior to the rules of the positive law and, to the
extent that the rules of the positive law conflict with the natural
law, the superior force of the natural law nullifies the rules of the
positive law.
The natural lawyer's belief that positive law owes its validity
to natural law enables the natural lawyer to claim that an unjust law
is not a law at all. It is the strength of that claim that appeals to
Professor Vaughan. However, natural law theory can be - and often
has been - used to silence criticism of the positive law. The
corollary of the assertion that positive laws that are contrary to the
natural law are invalid is the assertion (made expressly in the
passage from Blackstone quoted above) that those positive laws that
are valid are consistent with the natural law.
How did the laws of England in 1765 (when Blackstone
wrote) measure up against the natural law? According to
Blackstone:
The idea or practice of this political or civil liberty flourish in their highest vigour
in these kingdoms, where it falls little short of perfection, and can only be lost or
destroyed by the folly or demerits of its owner: the legislature, and of course the
laws of England, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable
blessing even in the meanest subject.
8
One might be inclined to dismiss this statement of the
perfection of the laws of England as a rhetorical flourish, but that
would be a mistake. In the four volumes of the Commentaries,
which constitute an account of the whole of the laws of England in
1765, Blackstone found not one instance of a positive law in conflict
with the natural law.9 This is what infuriated Bentham, who
described Blackstone as "everything-as-it-should-be-Blackstone."
He saw Blackstone as an enemy of reform, an apologist for the
established order, using the theory of natural law to ward off the
criticisms of the law that were made by reformers like Bentham.
One must acknowledge, I think, that Bentham had a point.
8 Ibid. at 122-23.
9 He gave only the hypothetical example of a law that permitted murder, which he said
would be in conflict with the natural law. See Ibid. at 43.
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Blackstone's claim that all valid law was consistent with the natural
law did serve as a powerful reinforcement of the status quo.
II. DOES NATURAL LAW EXIST?
Let me turn now to the justification for my lack of belief in
natural law.
Natural law, if not handed down directly from God, must be
derived from reason. The reason must derive from the facts of
human nature (hence natural law) or at least from other aspects of
the human condition. However, if this form of reasoning is
portrayed as logically required, it falls into the well-known fallacy,
originally pointed out by Hume in 1739,10 of deriving an "ought"
from an "is." A fact cannot demonstrate the truth of a normative
proposition. Consider, for example, two facts: animals rear their
young and human beings are animals. These facts do not establish
that human beings ought to rear their young. To draw normative
inferences from nature confuses fact and value. The only answer
that a natural lawyer could give to this objection would be to point
out that forms of reasoning less rigorous than logical deduction can
still have persuasive force." That is true, but it severely weakens
the claim that a body of natural law can be inferred by reason from
nature.
A second reason for scepticism about natural law is that
there is no evidence of its existence. If a positive law that conflicts
with natural law is a nullity, one would expect to find some instances
of nullification. But there are no such instances. No court in
Canada (or anywhere else that I am aware of) has ever held that a
rule of statute law or common law was invalid on the ground that
it conflicted with natural law. This difficulty has led modern natural
lawyers to shift their ground and claim only that a conflict with
natural law removes or diminishes the moral obligation to obey the
10 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896).
11 This is the answer offered by J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980) at, for example, 34 and 219.
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unjust law.12 However, this robs natural law of its character as law
because an appeal to moral principles as a justification for disobeying
an unjust law is available to everyone, not just those who believe in
natural law. Civil disobedience has never been the exclusive
preserve of natural lawyers.
A third difficulty with natural law is that there is no
agreement among natural lawyers as to what the rules of natural
law are. It turns out that the "reason" of any given natural lawyer
produces rules that look suspiciously like the moral precepts of a
particular time and place and that appear inappropriate in another
time and place. Consider, for example, the natural-law rights
espoused by'Blackstone: "the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right of private property."1 3  It will be
noticed that this list does not include the equality of the sexes. Of
course, in 1765, women were subject to many legal disabilities
including, in the case of married women, the incapacity to hold
property.
Nor does Blackstone's list include the right to vote or any
other democratic right. Professor Vaughan, concerned to argue that
"Blackstone's principles are more immediately conducive to
democracy than are Hogg's,"14 says that the right to vote is an "easy
and indeed necessary extension of Blackstone's statement."1 5 But
this is incorrect because it would have required Blackstone to nullify
the restrictions on the franchise that existed in England in 1765. At
that time, all women and most men (those that did not satisfy the
property qualification) had no right to vote. It will be recalled that
England had to wait another half century for the Reform Bill of
1832,16 which was enacted over the ferocious opposition of the Tory
party (to which Blackstone belonged), and which, although it made
important reforms to the franchise, still did not remove the
12 Ibid. at 290.
13 Blackstone, supra, note 7 at 125.
14 Vaughan, supra, note 3 at 402.
15 Ibid at 401.
16 An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales is cited as
The Refonn Bill of England, (U.K.), 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45.
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disabilities on women and propertyless men. Professor Vaughan's
depiction of Blackstone as a champion of democracy only illustrates
how different Professor Vaughan's 1991 values are from Blackstone's
1765 values.
As for the rights that Blackstone does include, even the
rights to personal security and personal liberty would require
considerable qualification today if we were concerned with sustaining
the mass of social and economic regulation that routinely interferes
with individual liberty. But the right to private property seems
particularly hard to accept. It would mean that socialist states are
founded on a breach of natural law. It would require major
exceptions to accommodate our own laws respecting income tax,
matrimonial property, zoning, pollution, health and safety,
expropriation, and the minimum wage - to name only the most
obvious of the modern state's inroads into private property rights.
Once again, one can appreciate Bentham's objection that
Blackstone's natural law was a mask that concealed a profoundly
conservative political programme.
Enough has been said, I think, to support the conclusion that
Blackstone did not succeed in deriving universal, immutable natural
rights. What he succeeded in doing was listing values that seemed
important to a person of his time, place, and class. This brings me
back to the thesis with which I started. The fact is that there is no
generally agreed-upon list of "natural" rights; there is no agreement
on the source of those rights; there is no agreement on the
reasoning process by which such rights might be derived; and there
is no agreement on how such rights could be enforced, although
there probably is agreement that such rights never have been
enforced. That is why I do not believe in natural rights.
IV. DOES IT MATrER?
Does it matter whether natural rights exist or not? Bentham
thought the issue was very important because he saw natural rights
as the enemy of any programme of radical reform. I think this
particular concern has disappeared. Today, an attempt to gain an
advantage in political debate by an appeal to natural rights would
416 VOL. 29 Nqo. 2
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be greeted with such scepticism that it could safely be treated as a
harmless rhetorical flourish.
However, I think Professor Vaughan raises a different
concern. He would like our judges to be better educated in natural
law and to apply it in their decisions. In my view, this would pose
a serious threat to democratic government because it would
authorize judges to give legal force to values that had never been
approved by any democratic process. Professor Vaughan invites a
return to the Lochner'7 era in the United States. Between 1905 and
1937, a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, sharing
Blackstone's belief in the sanctity of private liberty and private
property, struck down many state laws that attempted to regulate
wages, hours of work, prices, and anti-union activity. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, sharing Bentham's legal positivism, wrote dissenting opinions
in these cases, accusing the majority of using the language of rights
to mask a laissez-faire economic theory.18 Only after President
Roosevelt had proposed his court-packing plan did the Court swing
over to Holmes's position and overrule the decisions.
19
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms20 does not
contain a right of private property. In my view, a judge who
believes with Blackstone in a natural-law right of private property
should not implement this belief, but should apply the positive law,
which is the Charter as written. The Charter does contain rights to
vote and to equal protection. In my view, a judge who believes with
Blackstone that such rights are not natural-law rights should not
ignore or minimize or refuse to enforce those rights, but should
apply the Charter as written. I emphatically disagree with Professor
Vaughan that our judges should take their direction from their
conceptions of natural rights. They should take their direction from
the Charter
17 Lochner v. New York (1905), 198 U.S. 45.
18 Ibid. at 76.
19 West Coast Hotel v. Parish (1937), 300 U.S. 379.
20 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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